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Attempts to accommodate a women’s 
rights agenda in conflict and post-
conflict contexts presents us with 
unprecedented challenges. Gender 
advocates often bemoan the fact that 
scant attention is paid and insufficient 
resources are allocated to the gender 
dimension of post-conflict reconstruc-
tion, arguing that women’s involve-
ment is essential to achieving sustain-
able peace. However, the prospects 
for a rights-based agenda are, as I shall 
attempt to demonstrate throughout 
this text, compromised by the nature 
of the interventions that purport to 
uphold them and by the corrosive, 
long-term effects of prolonged conflict and endemic insecurity.
In contemporary post-conflict situations we encounter the “interna-
tionalization” of state-building under new forms of tutelage. This con-
juncture presents its own specific set of challenges. Foremost among 
these is the fact that donor-led institution-building may create enti-
ties with juridical sovereignty (and international recognition) but with 
little de facto power to effectively administer national territories and 
provide law and order.2 This poses serious dilemmas of legitimacy and 
calls for the management of multiple tensions between global and 
local players and political factions with different degrees of commit-
ment to state-building. 
The first part of this paper examines the nature of the claims made 
for women’s inclusion in post-Taliban Afghanistan by analyzing the 
outcomes of constitutional and electoral processes. The second part 
explores whether such claims have any purchase in contexts where the 
rule of law is severely compromised and where the social dislocations 
resulting from conflict expose women and girls to new and unprec-
edented forms of violence and insecurity. 
Promise of inclusion: “Democratization” and women’s 
rights
The constitutional process in Afghanistan offers important insights 
into the contradictions resulting from donor-instigated attempts to se-
cure women’s rights in the absence of a stable political settlement be-
tween an aid-dependent government and a variety of opposition groups. 
These include jihadi factions committed to a conservative interpretation 
of the Sharia and who have, so far, shown little inclination to compro-
mise on matters pertaining to the status of women. These contradictions 
were reflected both in the process and the letter of the Constitution.
After the fall of the Taliban, the international community and the Unit-
ed Nations acted rapidly to bring mujahidin factions and the political 
leadership in the Afghan diaspora together to agree to an interim power-
sharing arrangement. The resulting Bonn Agreement of December 2001 
was not a conventional peace agreement, however, since not all the war-
ring parties were represented and it lacked specific and actionable claus-
es on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). Instead, it 
was an externally mediated power sharing arrangement between the 
Northern Alliance and the international community. The Agreement 
endorsed the establishment of “a broad-based, gender sensitive, multi-
ethnic and fully representative government.”3
In the period of consolidation that followed, a process hailed as a rela-
tive success, synergies were noted between efforts of the international 
community, government bodies, and women’s civil society organiza-
tions. On 4 January 2004, a 502-member Loya Jirga approved the new 
constitution. Afghanistan emerged from this process with a new state 
structure based on a presidential democracy and supported by a bicam-
eral national assembly (comprising a 
lower house-Wolesi Jirga and an upper 
house-Meshrano Jirga) where the po-
litical representation of women became 
enshrined in law.
Some amendments to the draft con-
stitution were successfully pushed 
through in the period leading up to the 
Constitutional Loya Jirga. These amend-
ments included an explicit reference to 
the equality of men and women before 
the law (Article 22) and an increase 
in the participation of women in the 
Wolesi Jirga from one to two female 
delegates from each province (Article 
83). In addition, Article 7 of the Consti-
tution requires that the state of Afghanistan “abide by the UN Charter, 
international treaties, international conventions that Afghanistan has 
signed, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” These conven-
tions include the Convention for all forms of Discrimination Against 
Women that was ratified without reservations in March 2003. 
On the other hand, Article 3 on “Islam and Constitutionality” states 
that, “no law can be contrary to the beliefs and the provisions of the sa-
cred religion of Islam.” This article, along with its affiliate which declares 
Afghanistan an Islamic state, is not subject to amendment. The Constitu-
tion gives the Supreme Court the authority to determine whether laws 
and treaties made by the government are in accordance with the Consti-
tution, giving it the power to reject any law or treaty deemed un-Islamic. 
Thus, a Supreme Court dominated by religious hard-liners could poten-
tially become an unaccountable body controlling the legislature, execu-
tive branch, and electoral system on the pretext of protecting Islam. 
Contests over the “Islamic” nature of the state were overshadowed by 
a central dilemma that threatened to stalemate the proceedings of the 
Constitutional Loya Jirga; the choice between a strong presidential sys-
tem versus a parliamentary system. The draft presented by the govern-
ment proposed a pure presidential system, while the opposition, from 
jihadi groups and non-Pashtun areas of the country, favoured a parlia-
mentary system. 
Both the political stakes around Islam and the fact that different ethnic 
and political constituencies are locked in struggles of representation in 
defence of their collective rights substantially erodes the political spaces 
available to women, except as spokespersons of their communal inter-
ests. In fact there is little a priori ground for making simplistic assump-
tions about women’s primary commitment to subscribing to a common 
platform. Indeed, a report by Rights and Democracy claimed that “a ma-
jority of the female delegates at the CLJ were affiliated with violent, con-
servative factions and voted in line with their demands, dividing women 
in accordance with ethnic, religious, and factional identities.”4 A sizable 
proportion of the lower house (Wolesi Jirga) belonging to parties that 
could be classified as Islamist and jihadis are expected to be the best 
organized legislative force in parliament. Female members who hold 
27% of the seats are not necessarily expected to function as a coherent 
political group since they are affiliated with parties across the political 
spectrum.5 
Lest we imagine that this state of affairs is straightforwardly attrib-
utable to the “Islamic” nature of society, let us remind ourselves of the 
historical trajectory that led to Afghanistan’s current predicament. The 
various parties locked in struggle were consolidated in the process of 
the Cold War by proxy fought on Afghan soil. Different political factions 
were financed and armed by various countries with their own political 
agenda. The mujahidin supported by the United States to rise up against 
the Soviets also included the Salafist groups promoted by Saudi Arabia 
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plementation of Islamic law, but “were engaged in “staged publicity” 
that ritually affirmed their power and legitimacy.”7 
We must also re-examine any preconceived notions about the nature 
of normative frameworks informing gender relations in Afghanistan. A 
common assumption is that despite years of conflict support networks 
based on family and kinship have remained robust and that the exist-
ence of this social capital has avoided even higher levels of poverty. 
However, a crucial consideration in war-torn societies are the growing 
discrepancies between normative expectations and material realities. 
When men are no longer able or willing to honour their obligations yet 
continue to use male privilege to convert the vulnerability of their de-
pendents into material assets, we may witness novel forms of abuse. 
There is mounting evidence that new patterns of “commodification” of 
women arise in contexts where indebtedness and dependence on local 
strongmen and drug traffickers lead to loss of community autonomy 
and enmesh clients in dependency relationships.8 A study of indebted 
drug traffickers in Badakhshan province shows that women rank next to 
land in the choice of disposable assets used to settle debts. 32% of the 
traffickers interviewed reported selling a female relative.9 And a study 
by the IOM shows that young rural women (and children) are subjected 
to forced prostitution, forced labour, and practices akin to slavery.10 
Interpreting these trends as an expression of “natural” tendencies of 
the societies in question has the undoubted advantage of disclaiming 
any responsibility for escalating abuses of human rights by blaming 
them on “local culture.” A similar logic may authorize a form of double-
speak that upholds the principle of gender equality and social inclu-
siveness in official pronouncements, whilst marginalizing women in 
the allocation of development aid. 
Between the hammer and the anvil
State-building and democracy are the product of long and histori-
cally specific processes of political struggle for participation and voice. 
Civic rights—including the rights of women to participate as equal 
citizens—are also the product of these histories. The women’s rights 
and gender “mainstreaming” agenda that informs donor-assisted post-
conflict reconstruction packages adopts a technocratic approach to 
address what are fundamentally political prob-
lems. The legal and technical solutions offered by 
gender mainstreaming may be at odds with the 
“real politics” of highly volatile and insecure en-
vironments where women’s rights and the role 
of Islam become political stakes in the struggles 
between contending factions. 
The evidence from post-Taliban Afghanistan 
shows how democracy “by design” can legitimize 
social forces that are likely to resist the equal 
participation of women in civic, political, and 
economic life. This is hardly surprising since state-
building does not take place ex nihilo but draws 
upon social forces thrown up by the legacies of 
conflict which are themselves shaped by complex 
geopolitical influences. 
Above and beyond the political platforms of 
emerging power holders, however, I have argued 
that the social changes brought about by pro-
longed conflict have produced their own trans-
formative dynamic—a dynamic that can neither 
be fully addressed nor remedied by institutional 
and legal reforms. In that sense women are caught 
between the hammer and the anvil; they have to 
fight both for their formal de jure rights that are 
under constant threat from conservative social 
forces and for their substantive rights to security 
and human dignity that have become the casual-
ties of endemic lawlessness and impunity in their 
societies.
and Pakistan. After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union the country was 
left to its own devices until the Coalition-led invasion in 2001. In the im-
mediate aftermath of the Bonn summit in 2001, the Coalition continued 
to distribute arms and money to militia armies to assist them in the on-
going battle against Al-Qaida and the Taliban, while the international 
community stressed the importance of state-building and of a strong 
political “centre.” 
In summary, the notion that democratization by design may herald an 
automatic expansion of women’s rights does not stand up to scrutiny. 
It may be argued, with justification, that any reversal of the policies im-
plemented by the Taliban represented an unambiguous gain. However, 
reading off substantive rights from state policies and legal frameworks 
remains a misleadingly limited exercise in contexts such as Afghanistan 
where the vast majority of women have little or no contact with state, 
market, or civil society institutions. Furthermore, in contexts where secu-
rity and the rule of law are totally compromised and impunity on the part 
of multiple perpetrators of violence holds sway, the notion of rights—for 
men or women—rings hollow. Before turning to explanations that privi-
lege the role of Islam or local culture to understand the nature of abuses 
against women in Afghanistan, we would do well to train our analytic 
lenses on the ways in which the war economy has affected patterns of 
gender inequality and aggravated gender-based violence. 
Gendered legacies of conflict
In contrast to sophisticated analyses of political economies of con-
flict, in discussions of gender relations and women’s rights we often 
revert to a world of unchanging tradition and cultural stasis. One of 
the clear dangers of such an approach is to misrecognize or misinter-
pret what are, in effect, reactive behaviours of ordinary people as they 
try to grapple with the uncertainties of everyday life by treating them 
as mere extensions of local custom. The dynamics of gendered dis-
advantage, the erosion of local livelihoods, the criminalization of the 
economy, and insecurity at the hands of armed groups and factions 
are analytically distinct phenomena. However, their effects combine 
seamlessly to produce extreme forms of female vulnerability. Attempts 
at addressing issues of gender justice through institutional and legal 
reforms fall short of acknowledging these interactions or their long-
term effects on deepening the disadvantages of women and girls.
The Soviet invasion in 1979 and the resulting collapse of the state 
eroded whatever little institutional support existed for women’s pub-
lic roles and legal rights and the period of insecurity and upheaval that 
followed acted to annul any formal gains. Between 1979 and 1992 an 
estimated six million people fled their places of origin, rural infrastruc-
ture was decimated, and the Afghan resistance set the scene for the 
growing influence of Islamist parties and local commanders. By the 
time the Taliban emerged in 1994, at the height of civil war, Afghani-
stan was in the grip of endemic lawlessness and human rights abuses 
of all kinds, including crimes against women. The Taliban came to 
power with the promise to restore law and order, albeit through a par-
ticularly harsh application of Sharia. Taliban policies towards women 
imposed a virtual state of curfew on women and enforced mandatory 
covering under the burqah, subject to severe punishments for infrac-
tions. 
The gender regime imposed by the Taliban represented a major 
break with “traditional” forms of social control in various ethnic com-
munities across Afghanistan.6 Decisions relating to the dress and mo-
bility of women and to relations between the sexes that were previ-
ously monitored by households, kinship groups, and community 
elders could now be mandated by decree and enforced by groups of 
armed young men, sometimes with little regard for local hierarchies. 
This did not only oppress women but potentially disempowered non-
Taliban men by robbing them of their prerogatives. It would, therefore, 
be quite unhelpful to present their depredations as either reflections 
of local culture or routine manifestations of Islamic government.
We should concentrate, instead, on problematizing the different 
uses of gender-based violence deployed by diverse social actors in 
Afghanistan. The “privatized” violence exercised by kin groups and 
families in the service of honour and reputation must be distinguished 
from sexual violence used as a systematic tool of war to intimidate, 
despoil, and establish positional superiority, and from the public per-
formances of Islamic retribution (featuring spectacular events such as 
lashings and executions) deployed by the Taliban as a means of social 
control. The Taliban were not merely affirming their piety or their im-
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